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Ethical Implications of the Conscience Clause on 
Access to Postpartum Tubal Ligations  
ELEANOR BARCZAK† 
Catholic health care systems in the United States have long limited women’s access to 
reproductive care. Controlled by the Ethical and Religious Directives promulgated from the 
Church, Catholic hospitals are prohibited from performing abortions or sterilizations. In 1973, 
Congress codified the “Conscience Clause,” legally protecting the individual and institutional 
right to refuse to perform or participate in abortion or sterilization procedures based on religious 
or conscience objection.  
This Note argues that refusal to perform a postpartum tubal ligation based on the Conscience 
Clause violates medical best practices. However, in the case of an individual physician, 
possessing a conscience and direct connection with the patient, it is a permissible violation. An 
institution is fundamentally unable to form the deliberative process necessary to have a 
conscience. Therefore, using the Directives as a blanket institutional conscience objection 
impermissibly violates medical best practices. Finally, this Note proposes that an institutional 
denial of postpartum tubal ligations may violate the standard of care and be susceptible to a legal 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Jessica Mann planned to give birth to her third child at Genesys 
Regional Medical Center (“Genesys”) in Grand Blanc, Michigan, under the care 
of her OB-GYN of the last sixteen years.1 Mrs. Mann had a pre-existing medical 
condition and her doctor recommended a postpartum tubal ligation immediately 
following her cesarean section because, under the circumstances, any further 
pregnancies could be life-threatening.2 Genesys refused to provide the procedure 
over her doctor’s strong objection because of the religious ban on sterilization 
imposed by Genesys’ parent organization, Ascension Health.3  
This decision forced Mrs. Mann, just weeks before her due date, to choose 
between giving birth at Genesys with her doctor, who would not be able to 
perform her tubal ligation immediately after surgery, and finding a different 
hospital and physician that would allow her to have the procedure immediately 
following the cesarean section.4 In its response to Mrs. Mann’s request for an 
explanation, Genesys said the procedure violated its Catholic religious values.5 
Similarly, Rebecca Chamorro, a resident of Redding, California, was 
denied access to a postpartum tubal ligation during the scheduled cesarean 
section of her third child.6 Ms. Chamorro was a patient of Dignity Health’s 
Mercy Medical Center, the only maternity ward in her city.7 Together with her 
husband and her doctor, she decided she would undergo a tubal ligation 
immediately after her cesarean section delivery.8 When her doctor sought 
authorization from the hospital for the procedure, Dignity Health refused her 
request, citing its “sterilization policy and the Ethical and Religious Directives 
for Catholic Health Services.”9 The closest facility that took Ms. Chamorro’s 
insurance and would perform the procedure postpartum was seventy miles from 
her home, effectively forcing her to undergo a second a second procedure weeks 
after giving birth.10 
These are just two examples of the significant burdens placed on women 
trying to exercise their right to reproductive choice in the context of the growing 
dominance of the Catholic health care system in the United States. All Catholic 
institutions abide by a set of guidelines issued by the United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) called the Ethical and Religious Directives for 
 
 1. OCR Complaint on Behalf of Jessica Mann, ACLU 2 (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/ 
default/files/field_document/section_1557_complaint_on_behalf_of_jessica_mann_and_the_aclu_oct._25_201
5.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 2–3. 
 5. See id. at 11–12. 
 6. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, Chamorro v. Dignity Health, No. CGC 15-549626 
(Cal. Super. Dec. 28, 2015), 2015 WL 9584140 [hereinafter Chamorro Complaint]. 
 7. Id. at 8–9. 
 8. Id. at 4. 
 9. Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 10. Id. at 9. 
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Catholic Health Care Services (the “Directives”), which include, among other 
things, restrictions on providing abortion, contraception services, and 
sterilization.11 As the reach of the Catholic health care system has expanded 
across the country, absorbing small, secular hospitals and clinics along the way, 
fewer and fewer women have been left with access to these vital services.12  
In the face of this threat, this Note reviews the responsibilities of physicians 
and hospitals to provide reasonable care for their patients in a respectful and 
medically sound manner, while also allowing space for the physician’s 
individual ethical and moral identities and patient care in Catholic institutions.  
Part I of this Note provides the medical, social, and legal background 
necessary to understand where tubal ligations fit in the broad range of 
reproductive health care procedures legally available to women. Tubal ligation 
is a form of permanent contraception through sterilization, which has a 
complicated and disquieting history. A woman seeking the procedure faces 
significant procedural, regulatory, and instructional barriers to access based on 
this legacy.13  
Part II explores the increasing dominance that Catholic health care systems 
exercise in the United States and how an amendment to the 1973 omnibus health 
care funding plan known as the Church Amendment created an additional barrier 
to abortion and contraceptive care.  
Part III discusses the first half of the Church Amendment, known as the 
“Conscience Clause,” which codifies physicians’ and hospitals’ right to refuse 
to provide or participate in abortions or sterilization procedures.14 This Note 
argues that, while an individual provider’s conscientious refusal to participate in 
these procedures embodies the correct application of the religious objection, the 
extension of the concept of “conscience” to the whole institution is 
inappropriate.  
Finally, Part IV argues that refusing to perform postpartum tubal ligations 
based on a conscience objection, whether by an individual or an institution, 
violates medical best practices for the procedure. This Note proffers that when 
an individual doctor, capable of reasoned, deliberative thought, reaches a 
conscience based refusal, this is an ethically permissible violation. On the other 
hand, when an institution, which is not capable of such deliberative thought, 
creates a blanket refusal, the violation is ethically impermissible. Such 
institutional policies impede physicians’ ability to provide care and create 
unacceptable barriers to reproductive health care that should be legally 
actionable. Though conscience-based exemptions to medical best practices 
apply to all health care practitioners with respect to specific procedures, this 
 
 11. Leora Eisenstadt, Separation of Church and Hospital: Strategies to Protect Pro-Choice Physicians in 
Religiously Affiliated Hospitals, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 137 (2003). 
 12. Id. at 138. 
 13. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON ETHICS, OPINION NO. 695, 
STERILIZATION OF WOMEN: ETHICAL ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS 3 (2017) [hereinafter COMM. ON ETHICS]. 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000). 
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Note focuses solely on physicians. Additionally, any mention of Catholic 
hospitals includes both the individual hospital entity and the broader Catholic 
system.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. MEDICAL BACKGROUND 
Tubal ligation, colloquially known as “getting one’s tubes tied,” is the 
preferred birth control method for more than thirty percent of married women of 
reproductive age in the United States.15 The process is a form of permanent 
contraception wherein the fallopian tubes are cut and tied so the ovum cannot 
reach the uterus for fertilization.16 If a pregnant woman requests a tubal 
ligation,17 the medically ideal time to provide the procedure is during delivery, 
if performed by cesarean section, or immediately postpartum in the case of a 
vaginal birth because it presents minimal risk to the new mother and eliminates 
the need for a second procedure under anesthesia.18 
According to the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG), “[t]he immediate postpartum period following vaginal delivery or at 
the time of cesarean delivery is the ideal time to perform sterilization [tubal 
ligation] because of technical ease and convenience for the woman and 
physician.”19 During this time, it is easier for the obstetrician to access the 
fallopian tubes because the uterus is enlarged and positioned directly below the 
abdominal wall.20 If a woman is unable to receive the postpartum tubal ligation, 
she must wait six weeks until her uterus and fallopian tubes have returned to 
 
 15. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, PRACTICE BULLETIN, BENEFITS AND RISKS OF 
STERILIZATION 1 (2013), [hereinafter PRACTICE BULLETIN NO. 133] (replaced in 2019 by Practice Bulletin 209). 
 16. 1 Joseph B. Babigumira et al., Surgery for Family Planning, Abortion, and Postabortion Care, in 
DISEASE CONTROL PRIORITIES: ESSENTIAL SURGERY 113 (Haile T. Debas et al. eds., 3d ed. 2015), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/655391468130824512/pdf/953590PUB0978100Box385362B00PU
BLIC0.pdf. 
 17. For simplicity’s sake, this Note will refer to a tubal ligation performed during a cesarean section and 
one immediately following a vaginal birth together as “postpartum” tubal ligations.  
 18. See Martin v. Berthier, 39 So. 3d 774, 784 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (recounting extensive discussion of the 
standard of care surrounding a bilateral tubal ligation including timing, procedure and informed consent). In 
relevant portion the court states:  
Dr. Berthier explained that to do it afterwards would require a separate anesthesia and a procedure 
that was more dangerous. He emphasized that “it is the safest time to perform that procedure if the 
patient wants it.” Dr. Berthier acknowledged that “in strict terms, it was not an emergency that the 
tubal ligation be done.” He explained that “[t]he tubes were tied because Mrs. Martin had requested 
that that be done. There was no reason not to tie them at that time.” 
Id.; see also AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON HEALTH CARE FOR UNDERSERVED 
WOMEN, OPINION NO. 530, ACCESS TO POSTPARTUM STERILIZATION 1 (2012) [hereinafter ACOG OPINION NO. 
530]. 
 19. ACOG OPINION NO. 530, supra note 18, at 1.  
 20. Frequently Asked Questions–Contraception: Postpartum Sterilization, AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS 
& GYNECOLOGISTS (May 2016), http://www.acog.org/Patients/FAQs/Postpartum-Sterilization. 
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normal size and her body has recovered from labor.21 When the tubal ligation is 
not performed in conjunction with child birth, it requires a second surgery called 
an interval procedure.22 The surgery is generally performed using a laparoscope 
inserted through several small incisions and necessitates the use of an 
anesthetic,23 which carries additional risks.24 ACOG defines a postpartum tubal 
ligation as an “urgent surgical procedure” because of the relative ease of the 
procedure following labor versus the difficulties and heightened medical risks 
of undergoing a second surgery six weeks later.25 
B. SOCIAL BACKGROUND 
In the United States today, tubal ligations are performed alongside of ten 
percent of all hospital births, and women throughout the country rely on the 
procedure to plan their families.26 In fact, of women ages forty to forty-four who 
use contraception, fifty percent have undergone a sterilization.27 Sterilization as 
a contraceptive, however, has a complicated history that is rife with abuse.28 
While some women struggle to obtain the procedure, others, usually low-income 
women or women of color, have experienced forced sterilization at the hands of 
their physicians.29 
 
 21. PRACTICE BULLETIN NO. 133, supra note 15, at 2. 
 22. Id. The risks of an abdominal laparoscopic surgery include injury to the bowel, bladder, and major 
blood vessels. Id. at 3. 
 23. Minimally Invasive Surgery, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/minimally-
invasive-surgery/home/ovc-20256733 (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 24. General Anesthesia, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/anesthesia/home/ 
ovc-20163578 (last visited July 27, 2019) (stating that typical risks include nausea, vomiting, dry mouth, sore 
throat and shivering, however more severe risks include postoperative confusion, pneumonia, or even stroke and 
heart attack). 
 25. ACOG OPINION NO. 530, supra note 18, at 1. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Debra B. Stulberg et al., Tubal Ligation in Catholic Hospitals: A Qualitative Study of Ob-Gyns’ 
Experiences, 90 CONTRACEPTION 422, 422 (2014). 
 28. COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 13, at 3. 
 29. Id. Historically, the courts have also struggled with the concept of compulsory sterilization. For 
example, in 1927, the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute authorizing the mandatory sterilization of 
intellectually disabled, incarcerated women. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes argued: 
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let 
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing 
their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the 
Fallopian tubes. 
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). In 1942, The Court examined an Oklahoma statute authorizing 
mandatory sterilization for “habitual criminals” or persons convicted for more than two felonies involving 
“moral turpitude.” Without considering whether the law was generally unconstitutional as cruel and unusual 
punishment or a violation of the due process clause, the Court held that because it treated larceny differently 
than embezzlement (fundamentally the same crime), it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 538–40 (1942). Thirty years later, the 
court heard the story of two African American sisters, twelve and fourteen years old respectively, who were 
involuntarily sterilized by tubal ligation in a federally funded medical clinic. The girls’ mother, who was 
illiterate, signed an “X” on a consent form thinking it was for birth control shots. The Southern Poverty Law 
Center filed suit on their behalf, ultimately resulting in a ban on federal funding for involuntary sterilization and 
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Throughout the 1970s, gynecologists routinely used a woman’s age 
multiplied by her parity (the number of births she had carried to full term) to 
determine if sterilization was appropriate.30 If the number was below 120, 
sterilization was inappropriate.31 For example, if a twenty-seven-year-old 
woman had carried two children to term, she would be barred from having a 
tubal ligation because her “number” equaled only fifty-four. During this same 
time period, women of color or low socioeconomic status were subjected to state 
and federal programs designed to limit their fertility.32 “Between 1909 and 1979, 
physicians performed more than 60,000 forcible sterilizations in government-
organized programs.”33 These drastically divergent experiences created a 
“stratified” access structure based on race, ethnicity, class, and intellectual 
ability that greatly impacted the development of health care law in this field.34 
C. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In the late 1970s, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW)35 created Medicaid regulations aimed at protecting low-income women 
from forced sterilization and other nonconsensual procedures.36 The regulations 
restricted sterilization to women over the age of twenty-one and established a 
mandatory thirty-day waiting period after a woman requests sterilization before 
she can undergo the procedure.37 Though HEW may have had benevolent 
intentions in regulating sterilization, the regulation created immediate access 
issues, especially for low-income or at-risk women genuinely seeking 
sterilization procedures.38 Subsequent California state laws also attempted to 
 
in the revelation that between 100,000 and 150,000 poor individuals were sterilized annually based on federal 
funding. Landmark Case: Relf v. Weinberger, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/seeking-
justice/case-docket/relf-v-weinberger (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 30. COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 13, at 3. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. HEW is now separately the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of 
Education. HHS Historical Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/historical-highlights/index.html (last visited July 27, 2019) (“The Department of 
Education Organization Act was signed into law [in 1979], providing for a separate Department of Education. 
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) became the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) on May 4, 1980.”). 
 36. COMM. ON ETHICS, supra note 13, at 3. 
 37. Consent for Sterilization, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Oct. 2012), 
https://www.hhs.gov/opa/sites/default/files/consent-for-sterilization-english-updated.pdf (explaining that, when 
requesting a tubal ligation, a woman’s physician must explain all risks and benefits of the procedure, and the 
patient must demonstrate her informed consent before the thirty days begins tolling). Notably, however, the 
thirty-day waiting period applies only to Medicaid patients; women with private insurance are not required to 
follow the same consent rules. See ACOG OPINION NO. 530, supra note 18, at 2. 
 38. See generally Melissa Gilliam et al., A Qualitative Study of Barriers to Postpartum Sterilization and 
Women’s Attitudes Toward Unfulfilled Sterilization Requests, 77 CONTRACEPTION 44 (2008). 
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protect women from exploitation, oppression, and coercion, but created similar 
access barriers.39  
During this time period the Supreme Court heard and decided two cases 
regarding the legal protections for contraceptive care. In 1965, in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, the Supreme Court struck down a law prohibiting married couples 
from using birth control because the law violated their constitutional right to 
privacy.40 Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court confirmed that 
unmarried people have the same right to access contraception as married 
couples, concluding that anything different would be a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.41 Together, these cases confirmed the constitutional right to 
access contraceptive care free from state interference.42 Although the Supreme 
Court has not explicitly discussed tubal ligation, the case law indicates the same 
protection from state interference should apply to a woman seeking a tubal 
ligation for contraceptive purposes.43 However, given the limitations on the 
extension of the constitutional protection for contraception in case law today, it 
is speculative to infer any specific protections for tubal ligations or how courts 
would rule should they face this issue directly.44  
While I am cognizant of the regulatory and constitutional issues 
surrounding sterilization, including tubal ligations, they are not the focus of this 
Note. Moreover, as discussed in Part II, Catholic hospitals and health systems 
are not considered state actors, despite receiving funding from the federal 
government. Rather than attacking the constitutional validity of the Conscience 
Clause, this Note presents a discussion and analysis of who, if anyone, should 
be allowed to deny a woman’s access to her desired, and legally protected care. 
II.  THE IMPACT OF CATHOLIC DOCTRINE ON THE UNITED STATES HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEM 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
Religious organizations have long been a force in the health care field in 
this country.45 The first Catholic hospital in the United States opened more than 
 
 39. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6920, 6922 (1994); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70707.1(a)(4) (1981). 
 40. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). (“Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied 
by this Court, that a ‘governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state 
regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of 
protected freedoms.’” (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964))). 
 41. 405 U.S. 438, 446–55 (1972). 
 42. Id. at 453. (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, 
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.”). 
 43. See generally Alex Kandalaft & Maddie Doucet Vicry, Access to Contraception, 17 GEO. J. GENDER 
& L. 55 (2016). The constitutional discussion of contraception is a vast one and well outside the bounds of this 
Note, but Kandalaft and Vicry’s article on access to contraception offers a good starting point. 
 44. See, e.g., id. at 60. 
 45. Lawrence E. Singer, Does Mission Matter?, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 347, 351 (2006). 
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150 years ago, led by the Sisters of Mercy.46 Prior to the second half of the 
twentieth century, Catholic hospitals generally operated independently of one 
another without any centralized affiliation.47 The 1980s saw a surge of Catholic 
hospital mergers, largely in response to increased pressure from health 
management organizations for cheaper health care as well as federal and state 
cuts to Medicare provider payments.48 In the following decade, and in the face 
of severe financial pressures, Catholic hospitals began acquiring non-religious 
institutions. Between 1993 and 2003, 170 non-religious hospitals merged into 
religious organizations.49 Specifically, between 1990 and 1998, there were 127 
mergers between Catholic and non-Catholic institutions.50 This flurry of 
corporate activity did not go unnoticed. In 1994, the United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops published instructions for these mergers entitled “Forming 
New Partnerships with Health Care Organizations and Providers.”51 This 
promoted additional growth: between 2001 and 2011, the number of Catholic 
hospitals grew sixteen percent while public hospitals and non-Catholic religious 
hospitals declined in number.52 
Today the Catholic Church is one of the largest health care providers in the 
country, operating 649 hospitals and 1614 continuing care facilities across the 
country, and providing care for one in six patients receiving medical attention 
every day.53 Said another way, the Catholic Church owns, runs, and regulates 
nearly fifteen percent of all hospital beds in the United States.54 Additionally, 
six of the ten largest non-profit hospitals are Catholic institutions.55  
Under canon law, the Catholic Church views its involvement in the health 
care field as an extension of its ministry, governed by the same ethical, moral, 
and spiritual principles.56 All institutions under the moniker of the Catholic 
Church must have a “sponsor” who is responsible for carrying out the charitable 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1093 (1996) 
(explaining that Catholic hospitals began merging during the 1980s).  
 48. Alison Manolovici Cody, Success in New Jersey: Using the Charitable Trust Doctrine to Preserve 
Women’s Reproductive Services When Hospitals Become Catholic, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 323, 326 
(2000); see also Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 138 (explaining that, in response to financial pressures, Catholic 
hospitals merged with each other creating “Catholic health care ‘mega systems.’ . . . [L]eaving smaller, non-
sectarian institutions vulnerable to exclusion from the market altogether.”). 
 49. Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 138.  
 50. Monica Sloboda, The High Cost of Merging with a Religiously-Controlled Hospital, 16 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 140, 142 (2001).  
 51. Heather L. Carlson, Freedom at Risk: The Implications of City of Boerne v. Flores on the Merger of 
Catholic and Non-Catholic Hospitals, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 157, 159 (1997). 
 52. Stulberg et al., supra note 27, at 423. 
 53. U.S. Catholic Health Care: The Nation’s Largest Group of Not-for-Profit Health Care Providers, 
CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/default-document-
library/cha_2017_miniprofile.pdf?sfvrsn=0 (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 54. Singer, supra note 45, at 351. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 353. 
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work of the organization.57 Accordingly, this person typically sits on the board 
of directors and has authority in making large decisions such as board 
appointments, spending limits, mergers and acquisitions, or any other changes 
to the structure of the organization.58 It is the Church’s involvement directing 
actual medical care rather than its business functions that typically garners the 
most attention and controversy.  
All Catholic health care institutions are governed by the Directives, which 
are the ethical and religious guidelines that articulate how to run a hospital and 
care for patients in accordance with the Catholic faith.59 The goal of the 
Directives is, first and foremost, to “reaffirm the ethical standards of behavior in 
health care that flow from the Church’s teaching about the dignity of the human 
person; and, second, to provide authoritative guidance on certain moral issues 
that face Catholic health care today.”60 The Directives cover a broad range of 
sensitive topics including the social responsibility of the Catholic religion in 
health care, the doctor-patient relationship, and patient care issues at the 
beginning and end of life.61 For each topic, the Directives provide a theological 
and moral discussion of the issues and a set of instructions on how to implement 
that theology in the medical arena, including both hospitals and outpatient 
facilities.  
Particularly germane to this discussion are the instructions related to 
“Issues in Care for the Beginning of Life.”62 Directive 53, regarding tubal 
ligation and other sterilization procedures, reads: “Direct sterilization of either 
men or women, whether permanent or temporary, is not permitted in a Catholic 
health care institution. Procedures that induce sterility are permitted when their 
direct effect is the cure or alleviation of a present and serious pathology and a 
simpler treatment is not available.”63 Tubal ligations do not fall within this 
exception; the procedure is solely for contraceptive purposes,64 and Directive 53 
therefore effectively prohibits the procedure. While the Directives initially 
functioned as corporate rules, they became partially codified in 1973 when the 
Church Amendment was enacted.65 
 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 355. 
 59. Id. at 357. 
 60. Id (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  
 61. See generally U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR 
CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES (5th ed. 2009), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-
dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-Health-Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf.  
 62. Id. at 23–28. 
 63. Id. at 27. 
 64. Chamorro Complaint, supra note 6, at 6.  
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000). 
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B. SENATOR CHURCH’S AMENDMENT AND THE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE 
The Directives derive their legal protection from a late amendment to the 
Health Program’s Extension Act of 1973,66 an omnibus funding bill providing 
grants and other financial support for healthcare institutions and providers.67 
Named after its sponsor, Senator Frank Church of Idaho,68 the Church 
Amendment was a direct response to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Roe v. Wade, which constitutionally protected a woman’s right to a first term 
abortion under her right to privacy.69 In the wake of Roe, numerous congressmen 
proposed laws and constitutional amendments that sought to limit federal 
funding for reproductive services and carve out due process rights for unborn 
fetuses.70 The Conscience Clause at the beginning of the Church Amendment 
sought to do so by addressing the religious motivations of the providers 
themselves.71  
The Amendment reads in relevant part:  
(b) The receipt of any [federal funding] . . . by any individual or entity does not 
authorize any court or any public official or other public authority to require – 
(1) such individual to perform or assist in the performance of any sterilization 
procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance in the performance of such 
procedure or abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral 
convictions; or 
(2) such entity to – 
(A) make its facilities available for the performance of any sterilization procedure 
or abortion if the performance of such procedure or abortion in such facilities is 
prohibited by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions, or 
(B) provide any personnel for the performance or assistance in the performance 
of any sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance or assistance in the 
performance of such procedure or abortion by such personnel would be contrary 
to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of such personnel.72 
 
 66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 2017) (creating and extending funding for health care providers and related 
facilities); see also Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 144 n.42. One of the major sections of funding was the Hill-
Burton Act, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946), which specifically focused on hospital and health care facilities. Established 
in the wake of World War II to prop up the hospital industry, during the first two decades of the program, over 
half of the hospitals in the country received Hill-Burton Funding. 
 67. Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 145. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 70. Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 145–46 (citing Harriet F. Pilpel & Dorothy E. Patton, Abortion, 
Conscience and the Constitution: An Examination of Federal Institutional Conscience Clauses, 6 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 279, 280-83 (1975)).  
 71. Id. at 146. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000). Whereas subsection (b) of the statue articulates protections for religiously 
based refusals, subsection (c) conditions federal funding on two antidiscrimination provisions, stating that these 
facilities may not discriminate in employment, privileging, or other hospital matters based on an employee’s 
participation in a lawful abortion or sterilization or refusal to perform those services for religious or moral 
reasons. Subsection (c) states:  
(c) Discrimination prohibition  
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This section is commonly referred to as the “Conscience Clause” because 
it provides for individual and institutional conscience-based refusal to perform, 
provide, or participate in abortion and sterilization procedures.73 Senator Church 
proposed the Conscience Clause specifically in response to Taylor v. St. 
Vincent’s Hospital,74 a Montana case decided just after Roe in October 1973.75 
In Taylor, the court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the hospital to 
perform a tubal ligation on Mrs. Taylor over the hospital’s religious and moral 
objections.76 The court concluded that because the hospital received Hill-Burton 
federal funding, St. Vincent was functioning as a state actor and therefore had 
unconstitutionally denied the plaintiff her right to the procedure.77  
The hospital appealed, using the newly passed Church Amendment to 
argue that, by granting it federal funding, Congress did not intend to force the 
hospital to violate its sincerely held beliefs and perform sterilizations or 
abortions.78 The district court in Montana agreed and affirmed its preliminary 
injunction.79 When Taylor reached the Ninth Circuit on appeal, the court adhered 
to the Conscience Clause, removed the injunction, and denied the plaintiff any 
relief.80 The Ninth Circuit stated that the Church Amendment “properly permits 
 
(1) No entity which receives a grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under the Public Health Service 
Act [], the Community Mental Health Centers Act [], or the Developmental Disabilities Services and 
Facilities Construction Act [] after June 18, 1973, may— 
(A) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or termination of employment of any physician or 
other health care personnel, or 
(B) discriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to any physician or other health care 
personnel, because he performed or assisted in the performance of a lawful sterilization procedure or 
abortion, because he refused to perform or assist in the performance of such a procedure or abortion 
on the grounds that his performance or assistance in the performance of the procedure or abortion 
would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or 
moral convictions respecting sterilization procedures or abortions. 
Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), aff’d, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 948 (1976). 
 75. 119 CONG. REC. 4252 (1973) (statement of Sen. Church): 
Given the injunction issued by the court against St. Vincent’s Hospital in Billings, together with the 
possible administrative ramifications of the recent Supreme Court decision on abortions, it should be 
evident that a provision needs to be written into the law to fortify freedom of religion as it relates to 
the implementation of any and all Federal programs affecting medicine and medical care. 
Id. 
 76. 369 F. Supp. at 949. 
 77. Id. at 950. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 951. 
 80. Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 523 F.2d at 77; see Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 147 n.55 (pointing out 
several cases that the Supreme Court could have used to justify a writ of certiorari). As in Eisenstadt’s article, 
discussions of these decisions are outside the scope of this essay. In a footnote, Eisenstadt wrote: 
The Supreme Court denied cert in [Taylor] over the objections of Justice White and the Chief Justice 
who dissented, arguing that there was a clear conflict between the circuits on this issue. See Taylor 
v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 424 U.S. 948, 949 (1976). While the Seventh, Tenth, and Sixth Circuits all 
agreed with the Taylor decision, see Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1976), 
Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973), Jackson v. Norton-Children’s Hosp., 
K - BARCZAK_13 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019  8:01 PM 
August 2019] ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONSCIENCE CLAUSE 1625 
denominational hospitals to refuse to perform sterilizations.”81 With this ruling 
the judicial branch affirmed the Amendment’s intended interpretation and 
solidified a legal barrier to the procedure.82  
In the years following its inception, both federal and state laws have 
dramatically extended the reach of the Conscience Clause in the United States. 
Today, the definition of “health care entity,” a key phrase in the statute,83 has 
expanded from traditional patient care facilities to include “provider-sponsored 
organization[s], a health maintenance organization, a health insurance plan, or 
any other kind of health care facility, organization, or plan.”84 Separately and 
additionally, Congress granted Medicaid and Medicare-based insurance plans 
the right to refuse coverage for objectionable procedures.85 Finally, medical 
residency programs are protected if they choose not to train their students on 
abortion or sterilization procedures based on a moral or religious objection.86  
Nearly all fifty states have adopted a conscience clause of their own to 
supplement the federal Church Amendment’s stance on abortion, contraception, 
and sterilization.87 Particularly relevant to this Note, as of July 27, 2019, 
seventeen states permit physicians to refuse to perform sterilization procedures 
and twelve states afford that same right to religious institutions.88  
Given the aforementioned laws, institutionally held moral or religious 
values limit a woman’s right to access contraceptive care at the medically ideal 
time.89 Thus, federal and state conscience clauses present many questions to 
 
Inc., 487 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973), the Fourth Circuit in Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 529 F.2d 
638 (4th Cir. 1975), had decided to the contrary. 
Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 147 n.55. 
 81. Taylor, 523 F.2d at 77. 
 82. See Eisenstadt, supra note 11, at 147. 
 83. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–161, § 508(d), 121 Stat. 1884, 2209 (West 
2007) [hereinafter Consolidated Appropriations Act]. The Consolidated Appropriations Act also states that 
federal funds are not meant to fund abortions, except in cases where the mother’s life is in danger. Consolidated 
Appropriations Act § 507. It also provides further protection against discrimination claims against health care 
entities that refuse to “provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or refer for abortions.” Consolidated Appropriations 
Act § 508(d)(1). 
 84. Consolidated Appropriations Act § 508(d)(2). 
 85. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001(j), 111 Stat. 251, 295 (1997) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(B) (West 2018)). 
 86. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 515(1), 
110 Stat. 1321, 1321–45 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 238n (1996)). 
 87. See Refusing to Provide Health Services, GUTTMACHER INST. (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/refusing-provide-health-services. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See, e.g., Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) 
(holding that a Catholic hospital could be liable for medical malpractice when it failed to provide a rape victim 
with “information concerning and access to” the morning-after pill, if the plaintiff demonstrated such 
information and access was the standard of care in the medical community); see also Hummel v. Reiss, 589 A.2d 
1041, 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), aff’d, 608 A.2d 1341 (N.J. 1992) (holding that during a life 
threatening pregnancy, failure to provide the option to abort the fetus at the facility or inform the patient that an 
abortion was medically indicated, based on religious objection, violated the standard of care and could be 
grounds for a malpractice suit). 
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grapple with. First and foremost, are they constitutional given the right to choose 
if and when to have children? Are they ethical? And, assuming arguendo that 
conscience clauses are constitutionally and ethically permissible, how do they 
impact reproductive freedom and patient care?  
III. ETHICAL, MORAL, AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF A CONSCIENCE 
CLAUSE 
A. PHYSICIAN’S CONSCIENCE 
The express purpose of the Conscience Clause is to protect practitioners 
from participating in procedures that the patient requests, and are within the 
accepted standard of medical care when those procedures conflict with their 
sincerely held religious and moral beliefs.90 Essentially, in the medical context, 
the Conscience Clause allows practitioners to “opt out” of a procedure that the 
medical community has deemed safe and effective. This type of exception 
therefore must be viewed with an eye towards its original purpose—to protect 
the provider’s sincere beliefs—and should be rejected if and when the exception 
no longer achieves this goal.91  
Webster’s Dictionary defines “conscience” as: (1) “the sense or 
consciousness of the moral goodness or blameworthiness of one’s own conduct, 
intentions, or character together with a feeling of obligation to do right or be 
good,” (2) “conformity to what one considers to be correct, right, or morally 
good: conscientiousness” and (3) “sensitive regard for fairness or justice.”92 
Moreover, the legal definition according to Black’s Law Dictionary mimics 
Webster’s, defining conscience as “[t]he moral sense of right or wrong; esp., the 
moral sense applied to one’s own judgement and actions” and “[i]n the law, the 
moral rule requires justice and honest dealings between people.”93  
The commonality among these definitions is self-inquiry, which focuses 
on individual awareness and deciding, acting upon, and taking responsibility for 
one’s own beliefs, morals, and actions. According to the renowned bioethicists, 
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, conscience is a version of integrity and 
self-reflection on one’s actions.94  
A person “acts conscientiously if he or she is motivated to do what is right 
because it is right, has tried with due diligence to determine what is right, intends 
to do what is right, and exerts an appropriate level of effort to do so.”95 The 
specific type of integrity enshrined and protected by the Conscience Clause is 
what Beauchamp and Childress call “personal integrity,” which, when expressed 
 
 90. See Refusing to Provide Health Services, supra note 87. 
 91. See Spencer L. Durland, The Case Against Institutional Conscience, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1655, 
1668–69 (2011).  
 92. Conscience, MERRIAM WEBSTER (2019). 
 93. Conscience, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 94. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 41, 44 (6th ed. 2009). 
 95. Id. at 43. 
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as a physician’s refusal to participate in a procedure, could create “morally 
troublesome situations” in which the physician and patient do not agree.96 The 
physician may have to compromise her moral commitments or leave the patient 
without the desired treatment.97 Beauchamp and Childress argue that, though the 
difficulty of this type of compromise cannot be completely ameliorated, it can 
be softened by adherence to “the virtues of patience, humility, and tolerance,”98 
which are at the very heart of the doctor-patient relationship, discussed here and 
more fully in Subpart IV.A below.  
The concept of conscience in a medical sense reflects not only a physician’s 
willingness to perform a procedure as discussed above, but extends to her 
medical decision making, ethical responsibilities as a physician, and the 
relationship with her patient.99 The American Medical Association articulates 
that relationship as fundamentally “based on trust, which gives rise to 
physicians’ ethical responsibility to place patients’ welfare above the 
physician’s own self-interest . . . .”100 Professor of law at Wake Forest University 
and bioethicist, Mark Hall, defines trust as “the core, defining characteristic of 
the doctor-patient relationship—the ‘glue’ that holds the relationship together 
and makes it possible.”101  
B. PHYSICIAN’S LEGAL DUTY 
However, a physician’s duty to her patients is not only an ethical 
responsibility, it is a legal one. In treating a patient, a physician must meet the 
medical standard of care in any given circumstance.102 Today, under the modern 
application of the accepted medical standard of care, the expectation is when a 
doctor treats a patient, she “takes on an obligation enforceable at law to use 
minimally sound medical judgment and render minimally competent care.”103 
The standard of care for a given procedure is not a fixed medical checklist, rather 
it changes with the state of technology through time and based on the 
circumstances of the particular patient.104 In practice, this means the physician’s 
 
 96. Id. at 42–43. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 43. 
 99. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician’s Conscience, Conscience Clauses, and Religious Belief: A 
Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221, 243 (2002). 
 100. Chapter 1: Opinions on Patient-Physician Relationships, AM. MED. ASS’N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND 
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2019-01/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-1_0.pdf 
(last visited July 27, 2019).  
 101. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 470 (2002). 
 102. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985).  
 103. Id. at 866. It is outside the scope of this article to discuss in detail how the doctor-patient relationship 
is first established, and thus the duty of care attaches, but when treating a woman seeking a tubal ligation, the 
strong presumption is that the relationship is clearly established. 
 104. See id. at 871. As Judge Spina of the Massachusetts Supreme Court eloquently stated in Palandjian v. 
Foster, “because the standard of care is determined by the care customarily provided by other 
physicians . . . what the average qualified physician would do in a particular situation is the standard of care.” 
842 N.E.2d 916, 921 (Mass. 2006). 
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treatment must be reasonable in light of what other physicians would do in 
similar circumstances.105 This means, based on a patient’s illness or condition, 
the physician must follow the accepted methods of treatment and provide any 
testing, medications, and procedures that the patient’s condition demands at the 
time of treatment.106 Failure to meet the standard, that is, to provide the 
appropriate level of care which subsequently results in an injury, could 
potentially result in malpractice liability. This Note does not argue that 
conscience refusal to perform a tubal ligation postpartum is automatically a 
breach of the standard of care; rather this Note argues that failure to perform the 
procedure at the ideal time is a breach of medical best practices. However, 
institutional “conscience” limits access to care, under some circumstances 
articulated below, this could constitute a breach of the legal standard of care.  
C. INSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE 
Institutional conscience as discussed here is the extension of an individual 
conscience to an organization and the people within it. Here, the Directives serve 
as “conscience” of the Catholic health care system as a whole. There are two 
fundamental problems with this assertion. First, the central problem of a 
hospital, or hospital chain, possessing a “conscience,” is the complete lack of 
the personal relationship to the patient that allows the reasoned compromises 
discussed above. Extension of the Conscience Clause exemption from an 
individual moral actor—the physician—to an institution, primarily a hospital or 
hospital system, is problematic, especially when the exemption becomes a 
mandate on providers who do not espouse any personal conscientious objection, 
and may, in fact, believe the institution’s position is a failure to provide proper 
patient care.107 In essence, the institutional Conscience Clause exemption allows 
individuals with no medical training to usurp the doctor’s decision making in the 
course of treating her patients.  
Given the definitions of “conscience” discussed earlier, which hinge on 
self-inquiry and individual awareness,108 is an institution truly capable of 
inhabiting the necessary innate human characteristics to activate the exemption? 
Ryan Meade, professor of Health Care and Policy at Loyola University Chicago 
School of Law, argues that it is not.109 Professor Meade takes the classical view 
of conscience—that conscience is not a thing a person possesses but rather an 
 
 105. See Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 498 (Ariz. 1978). 
 106. Hall, 466 So. 2d at 871 (“In the care and treatment of each patient, each physician has a non-delegable 
duty to render professional services consistent with that objectively ascertained minimally acceptable level of 
competence he may be expected to apply given the qualifications and level of expertise he holds . . . .”). 
 107. See Durland, supra note 91, at 1677. 
 108. See supra Subpart III.A. 
 109. Ryan Meade, The Natural Person as the Limiting Principle for Conscience: Can a Corporation Have 
a Conscience if It Doesn’t Have an Intellect and Will?, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 
103, 112 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017). 
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act—specifically, the “application of knowledge to particular facts.”110 A 
person, capable of both intellectual thought and willful conduct, gathers life 
experiences, expertise, and moral and ethical convictions to reach an act of 
conscience in choosing what is right. This is a singularly human process and is 
therefore misapplied to corporations.111 
Meade states that the idea that a chief executive officer or a board of 
directors can exercise the conscience choice for a company is an improper 
substitution for that of an individual person.112 Though the board may move a 
company to take an action, each board member is acting within his or her own 
moral and ethical codes, and therefore it is not the same as an individual decision 
because there is disparity between the intellectual processes involved.113 For 
Meade, the “key and central feature” of the human person is the individual 
ability to make choices based on one’s personal conscience.114 Foisting that 
choice on a group of people therefore “endangers the very concept of 
conscience.”115 Similarly, the mere aggregation and distillation of the morals 
and beliefs of all the individual members of that institution does not result in an 
institutional conscience.116 Even a small company, where each opinion is heard 
and valued, will ultimately face some decisions that incite disagreement, and one 
individual or viewpoint will prevail.117  
In a Catholic hospital, the Directives are equivalent to corporate 
regulations. The regulations must be followed whether the individual agrees 
with them or not. This is very different from a physician’s individual decision-
making process.118 Within this structure of misapplied corporate conscience, the 
Directives take priority over individual conscience. The non-Catholic 
obstetrician in a Catholic hospital is not free to follow her medical and ethical 
conscience in the treatment of her patient as she would be without the overlay 
of religion in the institution. It is also possible that the obstetrician may arrive at 
the same conclusions mandated by the Directives through her own deliberative 
acts. The first of these two situations robs a physician of her rightful 
conscientious choice;119 the second respects the physician’s rights. Beauchamp 
and Childress argue that the first situation creates deep internal conflict for the 
physicians, because they can “feel violated by having to abandon their personal 
commitments to pursue moral objectives created by the conduct of others,” 120 
 
 110. Id. at 106. “Conscience seems to be an act, for it is said to accuse and excuse. But one is not accused 
or excused unless he is actually considering something. Therefore, conscience is an act.” Id. at 106 n.11 (quoting 
Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputate de Veritate, q. 17, a. 1). 
 111. See id. at 107. 
 112. Id. at 111. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. at 107. 
 119. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 94, at 42.  
 120. Id. 
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in this case, the so-called morals of the Catholic institution. Both of these 
situations impact a patient’s access to a desired and safe procedure, pitting 
religious objection against the physician’s expert opinion as to what is best for 
her patient based on the widely-accepted understanding that it is safest to 
perform a sterilization procedure during or just after childbirth.  
IV. CONSCIENCE CLAUSES AS APPLIED TO POSTPARTUM TUBAL LIGATIONS 
VIOLATE MEDICAL BEST PRACTICES 
When a pregnant woman requests a postpartum tubal ligation, the medical 
best practice is to perform the tubal ligation during the cesarean section or 
immediately following vaginal birth, as the procedure is easiest and safest at this 
time.121 Therefore, when an obstetrician refuses to perform a postpartum tubal 
ligation at the time of delivery, based on her moral or religious beliefs, a tension 
arises between community practices, the practitioner’s beliefs, and the patient’s 
desired care that can be alleviated through the doctor-patient relationship.122 
However, when the decision to refuse care on moral grounds is made at an 
organizational level, as opposed to by an individual health care provider, it is an 
incurable violation of medical best practices.  
A. PHYSICIAN’S PERMISSIBLE VIOLATION OF MEDICAL BEST PRACTICES 
There is a difference between a physician individually refusing to provide 
treatment to her patient, and the hospital or hospital system’s administration 
automatically doing so. On the individual provider level, the Church 
Amendment correctly protects the right of refusal because, as a society, we need 
doctors to engage in the mental and emotional processes that go into making a 
conscientious choice on a case-by-case basis. As Beauchamp and Childress 
indicate, when the physician and the patient are at different moral extremes, 
there may be no clear middle ground; but because there is a personal 
relationship, the situation can and should be met with professionalism, patience, 
humanity, and tolerance.123 In such a case, a patient could decide to find a new 
provider whose values are more in line with her own, thus maintaining the 
patient’s autonomy and respecting the wishes of the objecting provider.  
Not surprisingly, patience, humanity, and tolerance are the types of 
characteristics that form the foundation of a meaningful doctor-patient 
relationship. In a first-of-its-kind study conducted by the Mayo Clinic in 2006, 
researchers distilled seven ideal physician “behavioral themes” or characteristics 
that patients valued most in the relationship with their doctor.124 The findings 
are summarized in Table 1, below. The seven characteristics were “confident, 
 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 18–21. 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 18–21. 
 123. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 94, at 43. 
 124. Neeli M. Bendapudi et al., Patients’ Perspectives on Ideal Physician Behaviors, 3 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 
338, 339 (2006). 
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empathetic, humane, personal, forthright, respectful, and thorough.”125 The 
study gave each trait a definition and provided representative quotations taken 
from interviews with patients at the hospital.126 Especially pertinent here are 
Bendapudi’s definitions of “thorough,” “humane,” and “personal” as they 
represent the same concepts Beauchamp and Childress identify as the social 
mechanisms for making compromise function in a medical setting.127  





Definitions Representative Quotations* 
Confident The doctor’s assured 
manner engenders 
trust. The doctor’s 
confidence gives me 
confidence. 
“You could tell from his attitude 
that he was very strong, very 
positive, very confident that he 
could help me. His confidence 
made me feel relaxed.” 
Empathetic The doctor tries to 
understand what I 





understanding to me. 
“One doctor was so thoughtful 
and kind to my husband during 
his final days. He also waited to 
tell me personally when he found 
a polyp in me, because my 
husband died from small bowel 
cancer and he knew I would be 
scared.” 
Humane The doctor is caring, 
compassionate, and 
kind. 
“My rheumatologist will sit and 
explain everything, medication, 
procedures. I never feel rushed. 
He is very caring. If I call, he 
always makes sure they schedule 
me. He told me he knows when I 
call, it is important. I appreciate 
his trust.” 
Personal The doctor is 
interested in me 
more than just as a 
patient, interacts 
with me, and 
“He tries to find out not only 
about patients’ health but about 
their activities and home life as 
well.” 
 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 340. 
 128. Id. 
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remembers me as an 
individual. 
Forthright The doctor tells me 
what I need to know 
in plain language and 
in a forthright 
manner. 
“They tell it like it is in plain 
English. They don’t give you any 
Mickey Mouse answers and they 
don’t beat around the bush.” 
Respectful The doctor takes my 
input seriously and 
works with me. 
“She checks on me. She also lets 
me participate in my care. She 
asks me when I want tests, what 
works best for my schedule. She 
listens to me. She is a wonderful 
doctor.” 
Thorough The doctor is 
conscientious and 
persistent. 
“My cardiac surgeon explained 
everything well. The explanation 
was very thorough. He was very 
concerned about my recovery 
after the surgery. I thought it was 
special how well he looked after 
me following the surgery. Not all 
surgeons do that. They are not 
interested in you after you are 
done with surgery.” 
 * The quotations in this table are excerpts of longer quotations in the 
transcripts. Respondents commonly mentioned multiple attributes in describing 
their best physician experience. For example, the quotation used to illustrate 
“humane” also incorporates “respectful” and “thorough” and was coded 
accordingly. 
 
When an individual physician invokes her rights under the Conscience 
Clause and refuses to perform a tubal ligation, she permissibly violates medical 
best practices—provided, of course, that she does so based on a sincerely held 
moral or religious belief. In such cases, the objection is the result of a personal 
and valuable mental process that we, as a society, need to encourage rather than 
penalize. The health care industry is an inherently personal one; physicians have 
intimate relationships with their patients, who are physically and emotionally 
invested in their physician’s decision-making processes.129 As the Mayo Clinic 
study demonstrates, it is important to patients that doctors—who know their 
patients on a personal level—rather than institutions engage in individualized 
 
 129. See id. 
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decision-making processes.130 Thus, laws need to protect a doctor’s deliberative 
process, ensuring that she is able to make her own conscientious choices so she 
can feel free and able to practice medicine ethically and effectively.  
This does not mean, however, that the physician’s moral positions 
automatically take precedence over the patient’s rightful claim to self-
determination. As Edmund Pellegrino, acclaimed Catholic bioethicist, stated, 
“[b]oth the physician and the patient as human beings are entitled to respect for 
their personal autonomy. Neither one is empowered to override the other. The 
protection of freedom of conscience is owed to both.”131 Within the context of 
the doctor-patient relationship, discussions of differing religious, moral, and 
ethical viewpoints can take place, and both doctor and patient can come to a fair 
and mutually agreed upon care plan that takes into account both parties’ 
individual consciences.  
B. INSTITUTION’S IMPERMISSIBLE VIOLATION OF MEDICAL BEST PRACTICES 
These conversations are not possible when the concept of conscience is 
extended to an institution as a whole. In this context, refusing to allow 
postpartum tubal ligations within a Catholic hospital is a systematic and 
impermissible violation of the best practice for tubal ligations because it is an 
inappropriate application of the Conscience Clause, which causes substantial 
downstream consequences. As previously discussed, an institution is unable to 
make the deliberative, conscientious choice that an individual could because 
such a process is inherently human.132 Accordingly, the extension of such 
protections to institutions is inappropriate.133  
If, in the current political and legal climate, we must find that a hospital or 
hospital system can have a conscience, then it should be on equal footing with 
that of the individual provider; in other words, one should not take primacy over 
 
 130. Bendapudi and her team offer one final patient quote as a fitting end to their article, which paints a 
similarly poignant picture here, illustrating why it is important for doctors to be honest and open with their 
patients. I argue that the Conscience Clause is one way some doctors can accomplish this task. The patient said: 
We want doctors who can empathize and understand our needs as a whole person. We put doctors 
on a pedestal right next to God, yet we don’t want them to act superior, belittle us, or intimidate us. 
We want to feel that our doctors have incredible knowledge in their field. But every doctor needs to 
know how to apply their knowledge with wisdom and relate to us as plain folks who are capable of 
understanding our disease and treatment. It’s probably difficult for doctors after many years and 
thousands of patients to stay optimistic, be realistic, and encourage us. We would like to think that 
we’re not just a tumor, not just a breast, not just a victim. Surely, if they know us, they would love 
us. 
Id. at 343. 
 131. Pellegrino, supra note 99, at 241. 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 109–117. 
 133. However, the Supreme Court, in 2014, held the opposite. In the landmark case, Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby, the Supreme Court held that closely held corporations are not required to provide contraceptive care to 
employees because a “corporation is simply a form of organization” that ultimately mirrors the values and beliefs 
of its owners. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
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the other.134 However, when the two conflict, currently the Catholic institutional 
“conscience” seems to be winning out.135 This is a miscarriage of what the 
Conscience Clause purports to protect and creates ethically troublesome 
situations for many providers. For example, one physician described her own 
conflict of conscience between providing care for her patient and abiding by the 
Catholic rules: 
You know, if you’re doing a c-section on somebody that wants a tubal and has 
had six other previous c-sections and, you know, if I tie her tubes I’m going to 
get kicked off the staff. And I just don’t think that’s right, but, you know, instead 
of benefitting my patients, I benefit myself and don’t do the tubal and stay on 
staff. So that’s difficult sometimes.136 
In situations like these, an institutional conscience created by a third party 
separated from the practice of medicine overrides and negates the physician’s 
expert medical opinion and prevents her from engaging in the deliberative 
process of applying her clinical, moral, and ethical knowledge to the situation at 
hand.137 In a very real sense, this system values a carte blanche rule over 
medically-based opinions at the patient’s bedside.  
The conflict between institutions and physicians is especially clear when 
the Directives suppress Catholic physicians’ expression of their faith. For 
example, Dr. Willie Parker is a physician and ardent Christian who believes that 
he is doing “God’s work” as an abortion provider in the Southern United 
States.138 Dr. Parker did not start his career feeling this way; initially he did not 
question the tenets of his faith against abortion.139 However, through his practice 
as a physician, his life experiences, and the words of Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
final sermon, Dr. Parker decided it was morally right, responsible, and necessary 
to help women in need.140 This is the deliberative and thoughtful process the 
Conscience Clause should protect because it embodies how we, as a society, 
need our physicians to behave.  
1. Institutional Denial of Postpartum Tubal Ligation as a Standard of 
Care Violation 
In the current corporate and political climate, redefining “conscience” to 
exclude organizations and reshaping decades of legislation are not likely to 
change the legal landscape.141 However, framing the issue as a violation of the 
 
 134. Durland, supra note 91, at 1680. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Stulberg et al., supra note 27, at 425. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Nicholas Kristof, Meet Dr. Willie Parker, a Southern Christian Abortion Provider, N.Y. TIMES (May 
6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/06/opinion/sunday/meet-dr-willie-parker-a-southern-christian-
abortion-provider.html?_r=0. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.; see also John H. Richardson, The Abortion Ministry of Dr. Willie Parker, ESQUIRE (July 30, 2014), 
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a23771/abortion-ministry-of-dr-willie-parker-0914/. 
 141. In 2016, the Department of Health and Human Services issued two new rules rolling back the federal 
requirement that employers must include birth control coverage within their health insurance plans. The new 
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standard of care, based on women’s lack of access, could make headway. When 
a religious doctor in a secular hospital refuses to perform a postpartum tubal 
ligation, the woman has access to other physicians who can and will perform the 
procedure. However, in a hospital controlled by the Directives, she has no such 
option. The threat to access increases daily in the face of the ever-expanding 
system of Catholic health care.142 For example, on February 1, 2019, Dignity 
Health and Catholic Health Initiatives finalized their $29 billion merger 
agreement, creating CommonSpirit Health, a 142 hospital system which will 
operate in twenty-one states.143 Concerned that the merger could limit care, 
California’s Department of Justice specifically stipulated that in order to operate 
its thirty hospitals in the state, CommonSpirit must maintain the current 
women’s healthcare services in all locations for ten years after the deal closed.144 
The concept that lack of access to secular care could create grounds for 
legal action is not an entirely new one. Though there is relatively little case law 
on the matter, the following two cases provide the legal framework for this 
argument. In the 1989 case Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital,145 
a Los Angeles court stated that a Catholic hospital could be liable for medical 
malpractice when it failed to provide a rape victim with “information concerning 
and access to” the morning-after pill, if the plaintiff demonstrated such 
information and access was the standard of care in the medical community.146 
Similarly, in the pre-Roe abortion case Hummel v. Reiss, the Court indicated that 
during a life threatening pregnancy, failure to provide the option to abort the 
fetus at the facility or inform the patient that an abortion was medically 
indicated, based on religious objection, violated the standard of care and could 
be grounds for a malpractice suit.147  
 
regulations broadened the exemption from religious institutions to any business with a morally based objection 
to providing birth control. Robert Pear, Rebecca R. Ruiz & Laurie Goodstein, Trump Administration Rolls Back 
Birth Control Mandate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/us/politics/trump-
contraception-birth-control.html. 
 142. See Alex Kacik, Catholic Health Initiatives, Dignity Health Combine to Form CommonSpirit Health, 
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20190201/NEWS/190209994/ 
catholic-health-initiatives-dignity-health-combine-to-form-commonspirit-health.  
 143. Id.; see also Tara Bannow & Alex Kacik, CHI-Dignity Mega-Merger to Test Co-CEO Model, MOD. 
HEALTHCARE (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20171209/NEWS/171209851/chi-
dignity-mega-merger-to-test-co-ceo-model. 
 144. Tara Bannow, California DOJ Greenlights CHI-Dignity Merger, with Conditions, MOD. HEALTHCARE 
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20181121/NEWS/181129974/california-doj-
greenlights-chi-dignity-merger-with-conditions; see also Letter from Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, 
California DOJ, to Rick L. Grossman, Executive Vice President & General Counsel, Dignity Health (Nov. 21 
2018), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/charities/nonprofithosp/dignity-ag-decision-112118.pdf. 
 145. 256 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 146. Id. at 245; see also Brietta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty and 
the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 82 OR. L. REV. 625, 641–42 (2003). 
 147. 589 A.2d 1041, 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), aff’d, 608 A.2d 1341 (N.J. 1992). In Hummel, 
the plaintiff, suffering from blood poisoning from a uterine infection had severe complications during labor 
when she delivered a stillborn fetus and the obstetrician subsequently discovered she was still carrying a second 
fetus. Her condition worsened, endangering her life, but she was not informed that an abortion was medically 
indicated. When she delivered the second fetus, it was less than two pounds and severely disabled. Mrs. 
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The fundamental issue in both of these cases is access—in Brownfield, 
access to information and contraception, and in Hummel, access to information 
and a medically indicated procedure. I posit that neither of these situations would 
have occurred in a secular hospital. If an individual provider objected to the 
procedure or medication based on his or her conscience, the patient could still 
have access to the medical standard of care in her moment of need. The 
violations the courts identified in both cases here are systematic and therefore 
impermissible. Even the Catholic Church itself recognizes there are areas in 
which doctrine must fold to medicine. In the 1994 edition of the Directives, 
USCCB conceded that rape victims should be afforded emergency 
contraception, even within a Catholic institution.148 In the previous 1971 version 
of the Directives, the guidance on contraception reads “every action which, 
either in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the 
development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a 
means to render procreation impossible” is impermissible.149 In contrast, the 
1994 Directive states that in a case where a woman has been raped or sexually 
assaulted, “[i]f, after appropriate testing, there is no evidence that conception 
has occurred already, she may be treated with medications that would prevent 
ovulation, sperm capacitation or fertilization.”150 This small change indicates 
there is room to attack the Directives and thus, institutional conscience 
clauses.151  
Tubal ligations provide an excellent test case: as discussed above, denial 
of postpartum tubal ligations may result in unnecessary additional surgeries 
including risks from anesthesia, and therefore could constitute a violation of the 
standard of care.152 Tubal ligations also do not come with the emotional and 
political baggage that clings on so tightly to the abortion discussion. At least 
here, there is hope for true headway. 
CONCLUSION 
Conscience is an innate human characteristic that is essential to who we 
are as individuals. Our consciences help us make good choices and engage in 
society in meaningful ways. The medical profession demands conscientious 
 
Hummel’s claims were not timely, however, because the case preceded Roe, and there was no established doctor-
patient relationship between the doctor and the fetus.  
 148. KEVIN D. O’ROURKE & PHILIP BOYLE, MEDICAL ETHICS: SOURCES OF CATHOLIC TEACHINGS 138 (3d 
ed. 1999).  
 149. Catholic Physicians’ Guild, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities, 39 
LINACRE QUARTERLY 8, 11 (1972), http://epublications.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1240& 
context=lnq. 
 150. O’ROURKE & BOYLE, supra note 148, at 138. 
 151. Though the change from the 1971 Directive on contraception to the 1994 version was not shaped by 
Brownfield alone, I argue that litigation is at least partially responsible for instigating change within the doctrine.  
 152. Though Directive 53 states sterilization may be performed to alleviate a present and serious pathology, 
this is not a reasonable situation as tubal ligations are performed for contraceptive purposes only. See supra text 
accompanying note 64.  
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decision-making and, while the Church Amendment rightfully protects 
individual physicians’ conscientious autonomy by allowing them to refuse to 
perform medical procedures to which they are morally opposed, it also inhibits 
physicians’ conscientious autonomy by allowing non-physicians to usurp the 
conscientious decision-making process, requiring them to abstain from 
performing consensual sterilization procedures.  
Conscientious objection to postpartum tubal ligations violates medical best 
practices, regardless of whether the objector is an individual or an organization. 
However, the individual provider makes this objection by applying expert 
knowledge, morals and religious values in real situations involving actual, rather 
than hypothetical, patients. The institution may reach the same conclusion, but 
it does so by adhering to bright line rules without conscientious deliberation. 
Because of this, the Conscience Clause is misapplied to the institution as a whole 
and creates an incurable barrier to women’s health care, impermissibly violates 
medical best practices, and systemically suppresses the conscientious practice 
of physicians within Catholic institutions.  
The non-litigious solution to both the patient access and physician moral 
disenfranchisement concerns is to simply enforce uniform application of the 
Conscience Clause, allowing secular doctors to object to the Directives when 
their conscience tells them to perform a prohibited procedure in a Catholic 
hospital. Slowly, women like Rebecca Chamorro and Jessica Mann, together 
with their physicians and lawyers insisting on the application of the medical 
standard, should build on legal precedent and chip away at Catholic health care’s 
systematic denial of women’s reproductive rights.  
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